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A JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE FOR THE
TRUE CODIFICATION OF PAYMENTS LAW
PETER A. ALCES *
INTRODUCTION

NCREASED technological sophistication t and evolving financial institution procedures' have created a gap between commercial practices
and the codified law of payments. Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) does not contemplate the likes of check truncation,3 access
* Assistant Professor, University of Alabama School of Law; A.B. 1977, Lafayette
College; J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. The author gratefully acknowledges the very
thorough research and editorial assistance provided by David K. Taylor, J.D. 1984, University of Alabama.
1. See National Comm'n on Elec. Fund Transfers, EFT in the United States 1
(1977) ("EFT systems and services represent an alternative that will operate side-by-side
with the traditional cash and check payment systems.") [hereinafter cited as EFT in the
U.S.]; N. Penney & D. Baker, The Law of Electronic Fund Transfer Systems iii (1980)
(discussing the "technological revolution at work in banking").
2. It has been estimated that by 1985 banks will process sixty billion checks annually. See Brennan, Better Resting Place for Bank Checks?, ABA (Am. Bankers Ass'n]
Banking J. 47, 47 (May 1980); see also Leary & High, The Place of EFT and Check
Truncation in CorporatePayment Systems, 5 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 6 n.31 (1980) (noting that
one bank processed two billion checks in 1977). Procedures intended to streamline the
collection process include check truncation, see infra note 3, computer sorting and posting, magnetic encoding of checks, and off-premises data processing centers. See B. Clark,
The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards C 10.1 (rev. ed. 1981). For an
excellent history of the banking industry's response to the technological revolution of the
past 30 years, see N. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, Ir 1.01. Of course this has not
been the first time technological change has affected commercial law. Grant Gilmore
commented in 1948 that "[t]echnological changes in the methods of production and distribution of goods have over the last hundred and fifty years rendered the. . . common
law of sales quaint and archaic." Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial
Law, 57 Yale L.J. 1341, 1343 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore I].
3. Check truncation occurs when a bank retains paper checks rather than returning
them to the customer. N. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, r 1.01, at 1-13. In this
process, electronic or computer data are substituted for paper in the processing system.
(Credit card slips are also often truncated.) In the check truncation system most widely
used today, the drawee bank keeps the check and sends the customer a detailed periodic
statement. Some drawee banks send their customers an "Account Reconciliation Statement," containing a description of each payment-amount, date, check number and a
special number for retrieval purposes. A copy of the original check is forwarded to the
customer upon request. Other drawee banks supply their depositors with checkbooks
that make a carbonless copy of the check as it is written. See id. I" 2.01, at 2-2 to -4. A
more complex truncation system, within the current technology but not yet fully implemented, is depositary bank retention of checks. After receiving the items, the depositary
bank microfilms the checks and electronically sends the vital information (amount and
account number) to the drawee bank. If the drawee bank agrees to pay, settlement is
made and after a period of time the depositary bank destroys the original check. The use
of an intermediary bank is eliminated by this procedure. See Arthur D. Little, Inc., The
Consequences of Electronic Funds Transfer 73 (1975); D. Baker & R. Brandel, The Law
of Electronic Fund Transfer Systems 2.03, at 52-4 (1983 cum. supp. to N. Penney & D.
Baker, supra note I); B. Clark, supra note 2, 10.6. For a more detailed discussion of
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devices,4 automated teller machines 5 or wire transfers,6 and is therefore
check truncation, see N. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, 11 2.01-.03; Leary & High,
supra note 2; White, Legal Guidelinesfor Check Truncation, 2 Computer L.J. 115 (1980);
Note, Alternatives to the Present Check-Collection System, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 575-81
(1968); Kutler, Truncation'sBark is Worse than its Bite, Am. Banker, Aug. 15, 1980, at
1, col. 2.
Because check truncation is a modification of the traditional check system intended to
increase efficiency, the question arises as to its impact on specific provisions of the UCC.
Section 4-406, for example, imposes a duty on the customer to exercise "reasonable care
and promptness to examine the statement and items to discover his unauthorized signature or any alteration of an item." U.C.C. § 4-406(1) (1977). If the bank establishes that
the customer breached that duty, the Code may preclude the customer's assertion of
forgery or alteration against the bank. Under UCC § 4-406(1), the customer has no duty
to act, however, unless the bank (1) sends the statement and items to him; or (2) "holds
the statement" pursuant to the customer's request; or (3) "otherwise in a reasonable manner makes the statement and items available to the customer." Id. There is disagreement
over whether any of the three tests can be satisfied by truncated statements. Compare N.
Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, 2.02, at 2-7 to -9 (none of the three tests can be
satisfied; therefore, the issue turns on the bank's ability to impose a contractual duty on
customers to report forgeries and alterations) with B. Clark, supra note 2, 10.4, at 10-7
(the "availability test" would cover the case where the drawee bank keeps the checks and
the customer has knowledge of his right to examine them).
The Uniform New Payments Code (UNPC), Unif. New Payments Code (Perm. Editorial Bd. Draft No. 3, 1983) [hereinafter cited as U.N.P.C.], provides a solution. UNPC
§ 203 requires a customer to "exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine any
statement furnished or made available. . . and to discover any orders not authorized by
it or materially altered." U.N.P.C., supra, § 203. The comments following the section
explain how UNPC § 203 departs from UCC § 4-406:
First, the general obligation of subsection (1) applies whether or not the
actual checks are returned to the customer. . . . Second, given the applicability of the Section to all orders, the Section speaks of orders unauthorized by the
customer rather than unauthorized signatures or alterations. Third, the proposed draft extends the 14 day period now provided in UCC 4-406(2)(b) to 60
days where written orders or copies are not returned. This follows the 60 day
period allowed for EFT transactions under § 909(a) of the [Electronic Funds
Transfer Act].
U.N.P.C., supra, § 203 comment I on existing law. For a thorough discussion of the
effect of check truncation on a customer's duty to correct a statement, compare Penney,
Bank Statements, Cancelled Checks, and Article Four in the Electronic Age, 65 Mich. L.
Rev. 1341, 1358 (1967) (recognizing problems occasioned by check truncation) with
Clarke, An Item is an Item is an Item: Article 4 of the UCC and the Electronic Age, 25
Bus. Law. 109, 109 (1969) (suggesting that UCC Article 4 is responsive and applicable to
all banking issues presented by new payments systems).
4. An "access device" is typically a plastic card issued by the financial institution to
the customer, along with a personal identification number. See Note, EFTS: Consumer
Protection under the UCC, 10 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 497, 500-01 (1977). The device provides
access to automated teller machines (ATMs)--customer activated terminals enabling the
customer to make deposits, obtain cash and initiate payments at all hours. See infra note
5. The Federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1982),
defines the term "accepted card or other means of access" as "a card, code, or other
means of access to a consumer's account . . . for the purpose of transferring money between accounts or obtaining money, property, labor or services." Id. § 1693a.
5. An automated teller machine is a customer-bank communication terminal
designed to provide many routine banking services for customers. See Arthur D. Little,
Inc., supra note 3, at 239; N. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, 6.01. Banks place
ATMs both on and off bank premises. Thus, "[t]he ATM supports both the old and the
new payment systems. By supplying cash, it aids paper-based systems; by making depos-
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unresponsive to many issues of increasing concern." Moreover, the efficacy of Article 4 answers to commercial paper problems is eroding. For

example, the Price v. Neal' rule, which establishes a drawee's liability for
its, transfers from savings to checking accounts, and payments, ATMs aid in the development of [electronic funds transfer] systems." Id. 6.01, at 6-2. For other discussion of
ATMs, see EFT in the U.S., supra note 1, at 234; Budnitz, Problems of Proof When
There's a Computer Goof. Consumers Versus ATMs, 2 Computer L.J. 49 (1980); Winter,
Banking by Blip, 69 A.B.A. J. 263 (1983); Howard, Get Ready for The 'Smart Card',

Dun's Bus. Month, May 1982, at 88.
6. A wire transfer system is an electronic transfer of information and money between financial institutions. It has been estimated that wire transfers account for the
movement of $117 trillion each year. Arthur D. Little, Inc., Issues and Needs in the
Nation's Payment System 12, table 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Little Report]. While
the average check is $570 and average bank card transaction $38, the average wire transfer is $2 million. Id. There are several methods by which wire transfers can originate.
Transfers can be made by written instructions, repetitively or by customer order to transfer funds to another bank. In addition, banks send wires to the Federal Reserve to replenish their reserve accounts or to other banks to settle interbank obligations. Scott,
Corporate Wire Transfersand the Uniform New Payments Code, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1664,

1668-69 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Scott I]. The principal wire systems in the United
States are BankWire II, CashWire, CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payment System),
S.W.I.F.T. (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), FedWire
and telex. Id. at 1669. Although all systems provide a communications network, some
(S.W.I.F.T., BankWire II and telex) leave settlement arrangements to the parties.
Among the systems that do provide for settlement, two (CHIPS and CashWire) defer
settlement to the end of a specified period, and in one (FedWire) settlement is instantaneous. Two of the systems (FedWire and telex) are not owned by their users and thus the
users lack rule-making authority over the way the system is governed. The systems "fail
to provide adequate solutions to the ultimate liability of participants, or their customers,
for failures to settle obligations, fraud or mistake." Id. (emphasis in original). See generally EFT in the U.S., supra note 1, at 338-39 (discussing FedWire and BankWire); N.
Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, 9.01-.14 (discussing FedWire, BankWire II, CHIPS
and S.W.I.F.T.); Trotter, Is Corporate EFT Coming of Age?, 2 Computer LJ. 87, 93
(1980) (chart describing various wire transfer systems); Comment, Risk Allocation in InternationalInterbank Electronic Fund Transfers. CHIPS & SWIFT1

22 Harv. Int'l LJ.

621 (1981) (discussing CHIPS and S.W.I.F.T.).
7. See Dunne, The Checkless Society and Articles 3 and 4, 24 Bus. Law. 127, 128
(1968); Dunne, Variation on a Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposalsfor the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Checkless Society, 75 Yale L.J. 788, 791 (1966); Penney, Articles 4 and 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 La. L. Rev. 259, 259 (1966); Penney,

supra note 3, at 1367-60.
The conclusion that Article 4 is inapplicable to evolving payment systems is based
primarily on the view that a stored electronic payment message does not fit the UCC
definition of an "item": "any instrument for the payment of money even though it is not
negotiable but does not include money." U.C.C. § 4-104(l)(g) (1977). Once a check is
truncated, can the resulting "electronic blip" be categorized as an item? One state has
amended the UCC definition to include a "stored electronic message unit." Ga. Code
Ann. § 11-4-104(g) (1982). Article 4 has been held inapplicable to wire transfer systems
because of the § 4-104(l)(g) definition of an "item." See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.,
673 F.2d 951, 955 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982); Delbrueck & Co. v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979); Jetton, Evra
Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp- ConsequentialDamagesfor Bank Negligence in Wire Trans-

fers, 9 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 369, 398 & n.27 (1983).
8. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762); see W. Britton, Handbook of the Law of
Bills and Notes §§ 133-136 (2d ed. 1961).
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paying over a forged drawer's signatureg-at one time a reasoned conclusion consistent with commercial practices-lacks logical foundation in
this age of computerized check processing.' In addition, bank counsel
are looking for solutions to problems such as the treatment of "through
us" items, 1 and find none in the Bank Deposits and Collections provi9. The Price v. Neal rule is codified in UCC §§ 3-418 ("Finality of Payment or Acceptance") and 4-207 ("Warranties of Customer and Collecting Bank on Transfer or Presentment of Items; Time for Claims"). Section 3-417 ("Warranties on Presentment and
Transfer") provides the same warranties outside the bank check context. The rule is
predicated on the drawee bank's superior position to detect a forgery because of the
drawee's supposed knowledge of the customer/drawer's signature, and also on a desire to
end the transaction on an instrument when it is paid rather than reopen and upset a series
of commercial transactions at a later date when the forgery is discovered. U.C.C. § 3-418
official comment 1 (1977). For exhaustive treatment of the rule, see Edwards, Recovery of
Final Payments Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 341 (1979);
Note, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1891); Note, Finality of Payment and the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 Temp. L.Q. 182 (1959); Note, Allocation of
Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 62 Yale L.J. 417 (1953).
10. See Murray, Price v. Neal in the ElectronicAge: An EmpiricalStudy, 87 Banking
L.J. 686 (1970). The UNPC may sound the death knell for Lord Mansfield's 1762 Price
v. Neal opinion. Section 204 provides that each customer or transferor of an unauthorized draw order is liable to all transferees who pay on the order in good faith. U.N.P.C.,
supra note 3, § 204(1). The UNPC would abolish Price v. Neal because "the rule has no
convincing justification and some significant costs in today's high speed check processing
environment." Id. § 204 comment 2. "[The traditional justification that the drawee is in
a superior position to detect the forgery seems dubious today" in view of computerized
check processing, which makes it uneconomical to verify all signatures. Id. The "finality" rationale, which imposes liability on the payor bank to avoid reopening the transaction, is no longer relevant "in cases of forged endorsements where warranties are now
given to the payor bank." Id. The UNPC drafters viewed Price v. Neal "as not giving
adequate incentives to payees to check on the bona fides of people drawing checks to
them." Id. Moreover, the rule "makes no sense in cases of check truncation," see supra
note 3, because "the drawer's signature is not available for inspection by the payor account institution." U.N.P.C., supra note 4, § 204 comment 2; see B. Clark, supra note 2,
10.6, at 10-15 (justification that drawee is in superior position to detect forgery is no
longer applicable when depositary bank retains check). But see The New York Clearing
House, Statement on the Proposed Uniform New Payments Code 14 (Sept. 29, 1983)
(elimination of Price v. Neal may make financial institutions more cautious in dealing
with potential customers) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
NYCH Statement]. A drawee bank that has paid over a forged drawer's signature may in
some circumstances proceed against a prior party on a restitution theory. Compare Leary
& Schmitt, Some Bad News and Some Good News from Articles Three and Four, 43 Ohio
St. L.J. 611, 620-24 (1982) (payor bank may have right to recover payment from recipient
who was neither holder in due course nor person who changed position in good faith
reliance on payment) and Phillips, The Commercial CulpabilityScale, 92 Yale L.J. 228,
238-39 & n.57 (1982) (same) and Note, CommercialPaperand Forgery: BroaderLiability
for Banks?, 1980 U. I11.
L.F. 813, 836 (same) with J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of
the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 16-2, at 613-18 (2d ed. 1980) (construing UCC §§ 4-213 and 4-302 as an "obstacle to the drawee's restitutionary recovery
[under §] 3-418"). The crux of the issue is clearly presented, if not clearly addressed, in
First Nat'l City Bank v. Altman, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1966), affid mem., 277 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967).
11. A "through us" item or "payable through draft," unlike a check, is not drawn on
the drawer's bank account with a direction to the bank as drawee to pay the item. "Instead, it merely designates the bank as a collection agent to present the draft to the
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sions of the UCC.
In response to this dearth of statutory guidance, the Permanent Editorial Board"2 of the UCC in 1977 directed the 3-4-8 Committee1 3 to consider modifications and additions to Article 4. The Committee found
myriad shortcomings in the current law and began drafting a Uniform
New Payments Code (UNPC) to improve and make consistent existing
payments law and to provide statutory law where none now exists. 4 In
drawer-drawee for payment, thus giving the drawer a second look before finally approving payment through the bank." B. Clark, supra note 2, 3.7[2], at 3-43. "Payable
through" drafts are recognized in UCC § 3-120: "An instrument which states that it is
'payable through' a bank or the like designates that bank as a collecting bank to make
presentment but does not of itself authorize the bank to pay the instrument." U.C.C. § 3120 (1977). This device is usually used by organizations that wish to give to their customers check writing capability without participating in the bank processing system. One
example would be Merrill Lynch's Cash Management Account. The "drawer" has the
account with the brokerage firm, not the bank that actually processes the checks. See
Mittelsteadt, The Stop Payment Right in an Electronic Payment Environment: An Analysis of the Transition Problems Involved when Integrating a Traditional Right into New
Value Transfer Systems, 17 New Eng. L. Rev. 355, 402 & n.274 (1982). "Through us"
items pose analytical problems because the drawer is not a customer of the bank and,
therefore, the UCC may not apply to some aspects of the transaction. Id. at 402.
12. Chaired by Professor Herbert Wechsler, the Permanent Editorial Board of the
UCC is a joint committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCC) and the American Law Institute (ALI). Both the NCC and ALl were
created in response to the need for unification and betterment of law in the United States.
The NCC was founded in 1892. The Conference, made up of unpaid commissioners
appointed by state governors, primarily prepares acts in the commercial field for possible
adoption by state legislatures. W. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement
272 (1973). In its early years, the NCC restricted itself to areas "where Congress had no
jurisdiction." Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 Law & Contemp. Probs. 233, 237 (1965).
The ALI, responsible for the first "Restatements," had its beginnings in a 1921 project-a "juristic centre for the betterment of the law"-proposed by the Association of
American Law Schools. The recommendation of the project was that the ALI should be
initiated and "that its first major undertaking should be to prepare a 'restatement of the
law.'" W. Twining, supra, at 273-74. See generally Goodrich, The Story of the American
Law Institute, 1951 Wash. U.L.Q. 283; Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and
the First Restatement of the Law, in Restatement in the Courts I (perm. ed. 1945).
13. The 3-4-8 Committee was created by the Permanent Editorial Board in 1974 to
study Articles 3, 4 and 8 of the UCC. The Committee is a combination of academicians
and practicing commercial lawyers, some of whom have represented consumer groups.
Federal Reserve Board Staff members have attended Committee meetings. See Memorandum from Hal Scott to National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(June 15, 1983) (introduction to UNPC, P.E.B. Draft No. 3) (available in files of Fordham
Law Review) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Memorandum].
14. In 1978, Professor Hal Scott, Reporter to the 3-4-8 Committee, prepared a report
discussing the conceptual feasibility of a new payments code. See H. Scott, New Payment
Systems: A Report to the 3-4-8 Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code (Feb. 8, 1978) (available in files of Fordham Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Report]. The report was evaluated in the spring of 1978 at an
invitational conference in Williamsburg, Virginia attended by bankers, lawyers, academicians, consumer advocates and state and federal regulators. Based on this meeting the
Permanent Editorial Board authorized the 3-4-8 Committee to draft an outline of a
Uniform New Payments Code. For a history of the three drafts of the UNPC, see 1983
Memorandum, supra note 13, at 1-3.
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June 1983, the 3-4-8 Committee released for public consideration P.E.B.
Draft No. 3 of the UNPC. 15 Passage of the UNPC as either federal or
state law 6 is not imminent. 7 The seriousness of the Committee's efforts
and the perseverance of the interested parties, however, justify consideration of the UNPC's scope and provisions at this time. Even though the
UNPC is not likely to be enacted into law in its present form,' 8 it may
very well have a profound impact on the law of payments devices. 19
15. On June 26, 1983, P.E.B. Draft No. 3 was presented to the NCC. Committees of
the American Bankers Association, the New York Clearing House Association, and various Federal Reserve Banks have reviewed the draft. In addition, three committees of the
American Bar Association (Uniform Commercial Code Committee, Consumer Financial
Services Committee, and an Ad Hoc Committee on the Uniform New Payments Code)
are currently studying the drafts of the proposed code.
For further discussion of the proposed UNPC, see 1983 Memorandum, supra note 13;
1978 Report, supra note 14; Benfield, The New Payments Code and the Abolition of
Holder in Due Course Status as to Consumer Checks, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. I1 (1983);
Geary, One Size Doesn't Fit All-Is a Uniform Payments Code a Good Idea?, 9 Rutgers
Computer & Tech. L.J. 337 (1983); Pape, Stop Payment in the New Uniform Payments

Code, 9 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 353 (1983); Scott I, supra note 6; Scott, The Risk
Fixers, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Scott II]; Vergari, A Critical
Look at the New Uniform Payments Code, 9 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 317 (1983).

16. In his 1978 Report, Professor Scott gave three reasons why the Code should be
adopted at the federal level rather than in the states by amendments to Articles 3 and 4:
the necessity of integrating existing federal law of credit cards; the guarantee of uniformity at the federal level; and the desire to allow some federal regulatory body to flesh out
the basic statutory provisions. 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 253-54. "Of course, the
federalizing of payment law, including check law. . . may offend those who believe commercial laws should be a state concern, but they must recognize the reality of increasing
federal intervention in this area." Id. at 254. In the 1983 Memorandum, however, Professor Scott recognized that the federal government has "demonstrated an unwillingness
to preempt state law [on consumer issues]. .

.

. It may make sense, therefore, to pursue

both federal and state enactment of the Code." 1983 Memorandum, supra note 13, at 4647. He also recognized the possibility of either coordination of state and federal enactment or amendment of federal acts to defer to state legislation. Id.
Similar concerns also attended the enactment of the UCC. The predecessor to Article
2 of the UCC was the aborted effort to pass a Federal Sales Bill in Congress, which would
have remedied some of the inconsistencies of the Uniform Sales Act. Karl Llewellyn and
others supported such federal legislation on the ground that if Congress acted, it would
be difficult for the states not to follow. The President of the NCC, William Schnader,
however, supported maintenance of a decentralized government and was suspicious of
congressional intervention. W. Twining, supra note 12, at 277-78; cf Gilmore I, supra
note 2, at 1358 (predicting increase of governmental intervention in commercial
agreements).
17. Before promulgation and approval, the NCC requires two "readings." National
Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Constitution § 8.1-.3, reprintedin Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners 254, 260-61 (1979). The ALl must
also approve the draft. American Law Inst., Bylaws, Part V, reprintedin 58 A.L.I. Proc.
667, 672 (1982); Scott I, supra note 6, at 1665 n.10.
18. There are indications that the 3-4-8 Committee has already begun work on a new
draft of the UNPC. Letter from Marion W. Benfield, Jr., member, Permanent Editorial
Board, to Professor Peter A. Alces (Jan. 27, 1984) (available in files of Fordham Law
Review).

19. Due to the pervasive nature of the proposed UNPC and the recognized inapplicability of the UCC to the new payments systems, the mere existence of the draft payments
code will likely have an impact on the evolving law of payments systems. In addition to
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Professor Hal Scott, Reporter for the UNPC, has asserted that there is
no real jurisprudence of commercial law.2' Such a view ignores the work
of the UCC drafters, who expended considerable effort formulating a jurisprudence of commercial codification and applying it to the provisions
of the UCC. Their perspective was founded on concepts of legal realism
and, as a result, they established commercial procedures that make the
UCC more a restatement of expedient commercial practices than an effort to modify business custom.
The portions of the UNPC that are consistent with notions of legal
realism work well. Payments laws drafted along the lines suggested by
the established dynamics of the payments process will more likely attain
the type of symmetry that the UCC achieves. By focusing on particular
sections of the current draft UNPC, this Article will demonstrate the
benefits of codifying payments law in a manner consistent with the jurisprudential perspective of the attorneys and academicians responsible for
the UCC. It is when the drafters of the UNPC forsake that perspective
that the draft payments code fails. Confronted by a payments code that
does not work, the constituencies primarily concerned with payments
law will withhold their approval of offending provisions and prevent passage of comprehensive legislation."
The thesis of this Article is that only a "true code" that accommodates
diverse and often divergent interests will improve payments law. To
achieve that goal a payments code must be comprehensive; that is, it
must be pervasive in scope, codifying the general law of payments systems, paper-based as well as electronic. It should follow the example set
by the UCC and respond to current legislative deficiencies by clarifying
the law of payments devices rather than by attempting to change the
habits of the financial community. The new code should be no more
the several articles that the draft uniform payments code has occasioned, see supra note
15, courts confronted with the shortcomings of current payments law have cited the draft
UNPC. Eg., Santos v. First Nat'l State Bank, 186 N.J. Super. 52, 71 n.25, 451 A.2d 401,
410 n.25 (1982) (UNPC would clarify status of cashier's checks as cash equivalents).
Similar references were made when the proposed UCC was first drafted. See, e-g., Steller
v. Thomas, 232 Minn. 275, 278 n.3, 45 N.W.2d 537, 539 n.2 (1950) (sic) (cite to sales
provision of draft UCC); Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 11 Misc. 2d 312, 314, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309,
311 (Sup. CL 1957) (discussing implied warranty provisions of proposed UCC).
20. Scott II, supra note 15, at 737. In a later article, however, Professor Scott states
that in some situations the proposed UNPC "abandons contractual principles for allocating the risk of liability among the drawer and payor and transmitting account institutions, and applies principles drawn from tort law." Scott I, supra note 6, at 1699.
21. Indeed, there are indications that the financial community's uneasiness with the
current draft UNPC treatment of consumer issues may require the deletion of those provisions from future drafts of the UNPC. The 3-4-8 Committee asked Professor Scott to
rework P.E.B. Draft No. 3 and to "leave consumer protection measures to federal enactments." Leary & Fry, A "Systems" Approach to Payment Modes. Moving Toward a New
Payments Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 283, 286 n.8 (1984). A UNPC devoid of consumer provisions would render impotent any effort at comprehensive codification of payments law.
A statute that ignored the special equities attending consumer drawers could in no way
be a pre-emptive enactment, a true code. Professor Scott expressed just such a concern at
the -1983 Uniform New Payments Code Invitational Conference.
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ambitious than absolutely necessary, and should represent an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary step in the development of payments law.
Payments legislation should not impose artificial legal distinctions
among the various payments media. Before providing one transactor liability rule for checks and a different rule for credit cards, there must be a
substantial reason for doing so. The desirability of such uniform treatment is the guiding philosophy of the UNPC effort: "[T]he new legal
framework should not distort user choices among different payment systems, whether they be paper or card based, or electronic. . . . [T]he
same legal consequences [should] attach to all kinds of transactions,
where technology and the nature of the transaction [permit]. 22 That
guiding philosophy may be termed "internal uniformity." This Article
will suggest the proper balance of internal uniformity and variety of
transactor choice by reference to code-drafting methodology. Insofar as
the right to stop or reverse payments lends itself to controversy, focus on
the stop payment and reversibility sections of the UNPC offers a dynamic context in which to appraise the success of the drafters' ambitious
efforts.
The first section of this Article suggests the jurisprudential predisposition of the UCC drafters. The arguments for and against the codification
of payments law are then evaluated by reference to the goals of commercial codification. Next, the UNPC drafters' identification of "common
denominators" is presented as a necessary prerequisite to understanding
the UNPC formulation of the right to stop or reverse payment, as well as
to appreciating the efficacy of a provision of those rights by reference to
essential principles of payments law. Finally, a proposal is made to overcome commentators' reservations with the UNPC provision for reversal
of payment.
I.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW AS A RESPONSE

Over twenty years ago, in an article concerning the "true code" nature
of the UCC, William Hawkland explained the significance of codification. 23 He suggested that a code, unlike a mere statute, is a "pre-emptive,
22. 1983 Memorandum, supra note 13, at 1.
23. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. Ill. L.F. 291.
Hawkland's article shares many of the views adressed in Beutel, The Necessity of a New
Technique of Interpreting the NLL.-The Civil Law Analogy, 6 Tul. L. Rev. I (1931).
Professor Beutel suggested that if a proper science of interpreting uniform laws is to be
developed, a new system must be built that recognizes the statute and not the decisions as
the basic source of law. Id. at 19 & n.61. See generally State of N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n, Study of Uniform Commercial Code: Problems of Codification of Commercial
Law, Legislative Doc. No. 65(A), at 11 (1955) (considering codification of commercial
law of N.Y.), reprinted in I State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law
Revision Comm'n for 1955, at 41; Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Probs. 330 (1951) (discussing codification of commercial law); Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037 (1961) (same).
At the time he wrote the "Methodology" article, Hawkland was a Professor at the
University of Illinois College of Law. Currently he is Chancellor and Professor, Louisi-
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systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a whole field of law," 24 and
argued the merits of codification in the commercial context.
The composition and promulgation of the UCC were a jurisprudential
experiment.2 5 The UCC drafters focused on the purposes of commercial
codification and ordered the essential principles2 6 to realize certain controlling objectives: clarity, simplicity, convenience, fairness, completeness, accessibility and uniformity.2 7 A code that reflects an
accommodation of those seven goals would be pre-emptive, systematic
ana State University Law Center. Chancellor Hawkland is also an Alternate Member of
the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC and a member of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
24. Hawkland, supra note 23, at 292. Hawkland placed the proper emphasis on
"comprehensiveness" by focusing on the "operational-body-of-law" concept, which "dictates that the set [of laws] be sufficiently inclusive and independent to enable it to be
administered in accordance with its own basic policies." Id. at 310. It is premature to
pass final judgment on the scope of the current draft UNPC. The draft excepts two-party
credit cards (for example, department store accounts) from its coverage and may thereby
run afoul of the "operational body of law" requirement. The UNPC "applies to any
orders. . . payable by or at, or transmitted by or to, an account institution, and Articles
3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code do not apply even though the order meets the
requirements of those Articles." U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 2(1). The "Purpose" statement following the provision explains that two-party merchant credit cards are "not covered unless used to access an account for payment to a party other than the issuer. ...
The drawer does not initiate a direction to pay but requests the delivery of merchandise
against a line of credit or a cash balance held with the merchant." Id. § 2 comment 1 on
purpose. "An order is a complete and unconditional direction by a person to pay...
from an account which may be accessed to pay a person other than the drawer or the
drawee ... ." Id. § 10(l)(b).
Hawkland's impatience with "supplemental" and "fragmentary" enactments has evidently not been appreciated by the American Bankers Association Uniform Payments
Code Committee. See Letter from W. Robert Moore, Chairman of the American Bankers Association, to Robert Haydock, Chairman of the 3-4-8 Committee (July 15, 1983)
(discussing deficiencies in Permanent Editorial Board Draft No. 3) (available in files of
Fordham Law Review).
25. Professor Karl Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter of the Uniform Commercial Code,
wrote extensively in the area ofjurisprudence. See, e.g., K Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush
(1951); K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960); K. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (1962). Several of the attorneys
who were brought together to work on the UCC have claimed that they lacked any particular expertise in commercial law prior to their association for the UCC project. See,
e.g., Coogan, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 545, 545 (1982) ("Soia [Mentschikoff] says that she got into the Code by accident."); Leary, Reflections ofa Drafter,43
Ohio St. L.J. 557, 557 (1982) (described as one who was accepted for the Code's drafting
staff "because I knew absolutely nothing about it."); Mentschikoff, Reflections of a
Drafter,34 Ohio St. L.J. 537, 542 (1982) ("There wasn't a single expert on the editorial
board.").
26. For discussions on the role of "essential principles" in commercial law, see Gilmore 1, supra note 2, at 1348 (thrust of law was to conform increasingly intricate transactions to simple basic formula); Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to
ProfessorBeutel, 61 Yale L.J. 364, 365 (1952) (UCC should "state basic principles under
which business transactions can be carried out") [hereinafter cited as Gilmore II]; Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 687, 696 (1948)
(should seek to develop "relatively simple set of basic legal patterns which can meet the
essential needs of. . . a welter of variant practice") [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn I].
27. See Llewellyn I, supra note 26, at 687-90.
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and comprehensive. It is inappropriate to conclude, however, that the
success of the UCC experiment mandates code treatment of each and
every piece of legislation affecting commerce. Indeed, the efficacy of codification in a particular commercial context must be demonstrated in
light of current circumstances. Whether a true payments code is desirable necessarily depends on whether the problems to which the UCC
drafters were responding are present now with regard to payments
systems.
The UCC drafters encountered a body of commercial law comprised of
multifarious "uniform" acts, which had not achieved pervasive acceptance, 28 and vague "law merchant" principles. 29 These laws lacked the
precision and predictability that the drafters deemed vital to the interests
of those engaged in commerce.3" Karl Llewellyn, the principal draftsman of the UCC, recognized that the several uniform acts had been composed one-by-one, presented for adoption at different times in different
jurisdictions, and, consequently, contained "clashes of theory and uncovered gaps."3 1 The commercial law was "haphazard" and lacked coher-

ence, as different frames of reference32had produced legislation that ran in

"perplexingly different directions." Piecemeal amendment of existing
laws would only have exacerbated the problem. Such patchwork readjustment, guided only by "legal patterns of happenstance origin,"3 3 could
not have improved but would merely have changed the existing law.34
What was needed was a comprehensive focus responsive to the real deficiencies in commercial law and sufficiently flexible to accommodate both
technological innovation and the increasing sophistication of commercial

28. The NCC promulgated other uniform acts, which achieved some success. See
Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Colum. L. Rev.
798, 799 (1958). The task of adopting any of the uniform acts proved arduous. It took 47
years for every state to adopt the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. W. Twining, supra note
12, at 272-73. After fifty years, only 35 states had adopted the Uniform Sales Act. Id.
"[It has] never taken less than ten years between the date of promulgation of an act and
its adoption by a majority of the states." Id. at 273.
29. See B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 61 (1921) (law merchant is
not fixed or stereotyped). See generally Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales;
Should it be Enacted?, 59 Yale L.J. 821, 822-24 (1950) (discussion of law merchant principles). The "law merchant" was the system of rules, customs and usages that developed
in England to regulate dealings among merchants and traders. The use of documents
such as negotiable notes and bills became so prevalent that law merchant rules became
applicable to most commercial transactions. Id. at 823-24.
30. See Hawkland, supra note 23, at 299 ("[U]ncomprehensive and unsystematic
commercial statutes, even if widely enacted, inevitably result in lack of uniformity and
certainty."); see also F. Beutel, Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law 89 nn.38-40 (7th
ed. 1948) (citing over 75 instances where, on identical problems, courts interpreted sections of the Negotiable Instruments Law inconsistently); Corbin, supra note 29, at 834-35
(old law of sales needed improved rules, analysis, organization and remedies); Gilmore II,
supra note 26, at 367 (many conflicts arose in judicial construction of earlier acts).
31. Llewellyn I, supra note 26, at 690.
32. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Comercial Code, 10 U. Fla. L. Rev. 367,
371 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn II]; see Gilmore I, supra note 2, at 1342.
33. Llewellyn I,supra note 26, at 688.
34. See id.
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practices.35
Experience prior to the UCC and a sense of the needs of the business
community enabled the drafters to "distinguish passing fad from the
more permanent trend," 3 6 and to identify certain fundamental principles
crucial to the success of pre-emptive codification. They focused on existing commercial practices and prepared the several articles to give effect
to the intentions, expectations and objectives of the transactors. Changes
in the law were not made for the sake of making changes. Because they
were properly mindful of the appropriate (conservative) contours of the
endeavor, the drafters composed a code that has since been recognized as
benchmark commercial codification. This Article assumes the success of
the UCC experiment and considers the desirability of a payments code
drafted from the same jurisprudential perspective.
A caveat is in order. While this Article will argue the merits of payments law codification (perhaps the more accurate term is re-codification),3 7 the case will not be made for the promulgation of P.E.B. Draft
No. 3 of the UNPC. It is premature to jump to any such conclusion.
Rather, the instant inquiry treats those considerations which are, or, it is
urged, should be prerequisite to true codification of this area of commercial law.
II.

SHOULD CURRENT PAYMENTS LAW BE CODIFIED?

The present law of payments devices is convoluted, but that state of
affairs is not universally lamented. Change is resisted both by those who
represent financial institutions and by those who would safeguard the
interests of consumers. The arguments for and against true codification
of payments law are now sufficiently developed to accommodate inquiry
into their comparative merits in light of the goals of "code"
methodology.
A.

Existing Law

The current law of payments systems is at times contradictory, " ' occasionally merely inconsistent, 39 and too often virtually nonexistent.' ° The
35. See id.
36. Llewellyn II, supra note 32, at 372. Llewellyn reasoned that statutes should be
written in terms of the modem and foreseeable needs of the commercial world. Id.
37. Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC were, at the time they were enacted, supposed to be
the "uniform payments code."
38. "Visa checks" are one type of modem payment device as to which current law is
uncertain and contradictory. They are furnished to a cardholder by the issuer/financial
institution. The cardholder can write checks against his line of credit. Substantial questions have been raised as to the law applicable to this new payment device. See Memorandum from Donald J. Rapson to the 1983 Uniform New Payments Code Invitational
Conference (Sept. 30, 1983) (should "MasterChecking" be treated as a method of payment or an extension of credit, a check loan or a credit card cash advance?) (available in
files of Fordham Law Review).
39. A classic example of such inconsistency is "double forgery" under Article 4,
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law is nevertheless familiar to commercial attorneys: There is a body of
financial institution protection legislation;4 a separate body of consumer
protection legislation;4 2 and, finally, a payments system governed only by
common law contract and tort principles.43 A comparison of the two
legislative perspectives (pro-bank and pro-consumer) with regard to stop
payments manifests the incoherence of current payments law.
Uniform state law-Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC-governs check
transactions.' Article 4, "Bank Deposits and Collections," was drafted
with the interests of bank counsel in mind. The drafters' initial attempts
to place heavy responsibilities on the banks and to limit contractual exoneration from liability were vigorously opposed by bank counsel. At
times it appeared that the conflict could only be settled by dropping Article 4 from the Code, but a draft acceptable to the banks ultimately was
where a check has both a forged drawer's signature and a forged endorsement. The primary issue is whether the doctrine of final payment under UCC § 3-418 controls, meaning that the drawee bank absorbs the loss, or if the forged endorsement, despite final
payment, allows the drawee to place the loss upstream on a breach of warranty of title
theory. See B. Clark, supra note 2, q 6.5, at 6-103 to -104; Note, Commercial Paper.Double Forgeries and Loss Allocation Under the UC.C.: The Fork in the Yellow Brick
Road, 7 Stetson Intra. L. Rev. 241, 246-52 (1978). Compare Winkie, Inc. v. Heritage
Bank, 92 Wis. 2d 784, 285 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1979), affd, 99 Wis. 2d 616, 299
N.W.2d 829 (1981) (precluding commercial depositor from asserting any claim against
non-negligent bank from forgery losses) with Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. Girard Bank, 522
F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (refusing to give effect to exculpatory clause that shifted
forgery losses to corporate drawer; embezzler used signature facsimile machine). The
leading case on double forgery is Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.
1977). The court treated the double forgery as a forged drawer's signature, thus placing
the loss on the drawee. Id. at 414-16. Professor Clark has called Perini"one of the most
significant Article 4 decisions to date." B. Clark, supra note 2, 6.5, at 6-108. For a
detailed analysis of Perini,see Baker, The Perini Case: Double Forgery Revisited (pts. 1 &
2), 10 U.C.C. L.J. 309 (1978), 11 U.C.C. L.J. 41 (1978). For a discussion and analysis of
both Periniand Cumis, see B. Clark, supra note 2, q 2.1, at S2-2 to -3 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
40. See Scott I, supra note 6, at 1664 (fragmentary body of common law governing
wire transfers); see also NYCH Statement, supra note 10, at 7-8 (several problem areas
left unresolved by UNPC).
41. Article 4 of the UCC is classified by many commentators as financial institution
protection legislation. See, e.g., Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code
Should Not Be Adopted, 61 Yale L.J. 334, 361-62 (1952); Gilmore II, supra note 26, at
374-75; Leary & Schmitt, supra note 10, at 613-14.
42. The stated purpose of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r
(1982), is to provide "a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems . . . [and providing for] individual consumer rights." Id. § 1693(b). See H.R. Rep. No. 1315, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1978). For more on the EFTA, see Brandel & Olliff, The Electronic Fund Transfer Act:
A Primer, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 531 (1979); Fox, Another Step Toward the Cashless Society?
The 1978 FederalElectronic Fund TransferAct, 18 Am. Bus. L.J. 209 (1980); Schellie,
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 34 Bus. Law. 1441 (1979); Taffer, The Making of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act: A Look at Consumer Liability and Error Resolution, 13
U.S.F.L. Rev. 231 (1979).
43. Scott I, supra note 6, at 1676-78.
44. See supra note 7 for authorities that have considered the continued vitality of
Articles 3 and 4.
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included.4 5
There are several examples of the Code's pro-financial institution bias
in Article 4, only some of which have been emasculated by consumer
protectionist courts. 41 The "balance" struck by Article 4 is perhaps best
illustrated by section 4-403, "Customer's Right to Stop Payment; Bur-

den of Proof of Loss,"' which has been referred to as a "wonder of bank

lobbying."'4 1 In the event a bank pays an item in violation of a customer's stop payment order, the section places the "burden of establishing the fact and amount of loss resulting from the payment" on the

customer.49 Moreover, section 4-40710 provides financial institutions
with "another strong counterweight to the right of the customer to stop

payment under section 4-403":5" The bank may be subrogated to the
rights of a holder in due course, or to the rights of the payee or the
drawer, in order "to prevent unjust enrichment." 52
Predictably, there is no provision for reversal of payment of an
45. Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code,
1962 U. Ill. L.F. 321, 326-27.
46. Section 3-419(3), for example, was intended to restrict the conversion liability of
depositary and collecting banks. See U.C.C. § 3-419(3) & official comment 5 (1977).
But, as Professors White and Summers have commented, "the courts have taken up section 3-419(3), and what they have done to it shouldn't happen to a dog." J.White & R.
Summers, supra note 10, at 591-92. Some courts have remained faithful to the drafters'
intent. See, e.g., Keane v. Pan Am. Bank, 309 So. 2d 579, 581 (Fla. Dist. C1. App. 1975)
(bank not liable for processing check after dissolution of partnership). One court simply
ignored the section. See McConnico v. Third Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874, 883-86 (Tenn.
1973). Usually courts avoid the intent of the subsection by finding that the depositary
bank did not act in accordance with "reasonable commercial standards." See Hanover
Ins. Cos. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501, 508 (D. Kan. 1979); see also
Note, Depository Bank Liability Under § 3-419(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 676 (1974) (discussing various ways courts have approached § 3419(3)).
47. U.C.C. § 4-403 (1977).
48. B. Clark, supra note 2, 2.6[2], at 2-48. Any "duty" owed by the bank is effectively eliminated by subsection three. One commentator, however, has somewhat creatively reasoned that this section is consumer-oriented. See Pape, supra note 15, at 353
n.3. But see Beutel, supra note 39, at 361-62 (commentator asserting the pro-financial
institution bias of Article 4); Gilmore II, supra note 26, at 374 (same); Leary & Schmitt,
supra note 10, at 620 (noting Article 4's support of banking practices).
49. U.C.C. § 4-403(3) (1977).
50. Id. § 4-407.
51. B. Clark, supra note 2, 2.6[2],at 2-50.
52. U.C.C. § 4-407 (1977). There is disagreement regarding the meaning of "unjust
enrichment." Compare J. White & R. Summers, supra note 10, at 690 n.134 ("IThe
phrase at best states the purpose of the section, and at worst it adds meaningless confusion.") with Leary, Check Handling UnderArticle Fourof the Uniform CommercialCode,
49 Marq. L. Rev. 331, 367 (1965) ("[T]he obvious justification [for § 4-407] is the prevention of unjust enrichment at the expense of the payor bank who may be deemed to have
paid out its own i'unds."). See generally J. Calamari and J.Perillo, Contracts 571 (2d ed.
1977) (general discussion of unjust enrichment); Restatement of Restitution § 1 (1937)
(same); Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1208 (1973)

(same).
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"item" 5 3 in Article 4. The banking community's interest in finality of
payment would likely never have permitted such a provision at the time
the UCC was drafted. The existence of a similar right in contemporary
credit card law indicates a pro-consumer shift in the mood and predisposition of legislators. While the consumer's power pursuant to Regulation
Z54 and the Fair Credit Billing Act5 5 is not absolute, this federal legisla56
tion is more solicitous of the buyer's right to utilize payment leverage
against vendors than is Article 4. A customer who authorizes a charge to
his credit card account (for example, signs the Visa slip) may resist payment to the merchant if the sale is for fifty dollars or more and the consumer's billing address is in the same state as, or within a 100 mile radius
of, the merchant-seller's place of business." The credit card law thereby
modifies the result under Article 4 and notably eliminates the subrogation theory of UCC section 4-407.
Other consumer protection legislation in the current "patchwork" of
payments law-namely the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA)5" and
the Federal Reserve Board Regulations59 promulgated pursuant
thereto-provides for a consumer's right to stop payment but does not
provide a right to reverse." Although the scope of the EFTA appears
pervasive, several initial exclusions from its coverage severely curtail the
Act's impact on the law of payments devices. 61 The exclusion of wire
53. An "item" is defined in Article 4 as negotiable and non-negotiable paper calling
for the payment of money. U.C.C. § 4-104(g) & official comment 4 (1977).
54. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-.29 (1984). Cardholder liability for a lost or stolen credit card
is limited to the lesser of $50 or the amount charged prior to the issuer being notified. Id.
§ 226.12(b)(1). Regulation Z also delineates the procedures for dealing with credit card
billing disputes, id. § 226.13(c)-(d), and describes the information that must be given to
customers in their periodic statements, id. § 226.7. See generally Weistart, Consumer
Protection in the Credit Card Industry: FederalLegislative Controls, 70 Mich. L. Rev.
1475 (1972) (discussing statutes and regulations governing credit cards); Note, Credit
Cards: DistributingFraudLoss, 77 Yale L.J. 1418 (1968) (discussing federal legislation
dealing with credit card fraud).
55. Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 301-306, 88 Stat. 1500, 1511-12 (1974) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1982)). The Act establishes procedures for the
creditor and customer to follow with regard to billing errors. N. Penney & D. Baker,
supra note 1, 10.02[2][d], at 10-32 to -34.
56. See Nimmer, Consumer Payment Systems: Leverage Effects Within An Electronic
Funds Transfer System, 17 Hous. L. Rev. 487, 507-09 (1980).
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (1982). For a thorough discussion of that reversibility provision and its similarity to the Federal Trade Commission Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1984), see B. Clark, supra note 2,
9.7[2]-[3], at 9-34 to -41.
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1982) (originally enacted as Title XX of the Financial
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630,
§ 2001, 92 Stat. 3641, 3728-41). The EFTA governs transactions such as "point-of-sale
transfers, automated teller machine transfers, direct deposits or withdrawals of funds,
and transfers initiated by telephone." 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(g) (1984).
59. 12 C.F.R. § 205.1-.14 (1984).
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693e (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(c) (1984). States are permitted
to increase but not to restrict the EFTA's provision of consumer rights. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693q (1982).
61. The EFTA excepts "check guarantee or authorization services," "wire transfers,"
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transfer systems 62 is perhaps most noteworthy. This lack of comprehen-

sive legislation in the stop payment area thus evidences the inconsistencies and incoherence of current payments law.
B.

"Risk Fixing" and Other Arguments for a Comprehensive
Payments Code

Professor Scott recognized the necessity-indeed, inevitability-of a

payments code in a 1978 article63 in which he stated: " The commercial
law of bank collection. . . reflects the desire of transactors to alter the
competitive effects of the existing allocation of risk. Commercial legisla-

tion becomes the method by which particular interests achieve their substantive objectives, instead of a means by which society develops a
rational payments system."
Once the affected transactors perceive a
risk allocation system to be unfavorable to them, they will endeavor to fix
the risks to which they are exposed in order to establish the most desirable "competitive" environment. Professor Scott argued that the American Bankers Association Bank Collection Code (Bank Code) 6 was a
"certain securities or commodities transfers," "certain automatic [credit-debit] transfers," "certain telephone-initiated transfers," "trust accounts" and "pre-authorized transfers to small financial institutions." 12 C.F.R. § 205.3 (1984).
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (1984). The application of
EFTA consumer protection mechanisms to such commercial (wholesale) payments systems would be enormously wasteful. It would also duplicate existing private contracts
and association rules. The mechanics of the individual wire transfer systems (FedWire,
BankWire II, CHIPS and S.W.I.F.T., see supra note 6) are governed by separate "operating rules." See Scott I, supra note 6, at 1669-74. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 210.25-.38
(1984) (rules governing FedWire); Rules Governing the Computerized Clearing House
Interbank Payment Systems (1974) (CHIPS Rules) (available in files of Fordham Law
Review); N. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, 16.01-.04, at 16-1 to -13 (discussing wire
transfer rules). Moreover, federal regulations already govern wire transfers accomplished
by FedWire, the communications and settlement system operated by the Federal Reserve
Banks. See 12 C.F.R § 210.25-.38 (1984). The Federal Reserve System requires rapid
movement of messages between the various banks and branch offices. Currently, each
Federal Reserve district office has communications switches to which Reserve Banks,
branches, offices, the Treasury and member banks are interconnected by way of a computer message switching complex in Culpepper, Virginia. This allows administrative and
research information to be sent quickly and accurately. See N. Penney & D. Baker, supra
note 1, 9.02, at 9-3. FedWire effects bilateral net settlement at the end of each banking
day. Scott I, supra note 6, at 1670. S.W.I.F.T. has no settlement capacity. N. Penney &
D. Baker, supra note 1, 9.05, at 9-14. For a thorough treatment of the application of
the UNPC to wire transfers, see Scott I, supra note 6.
63. Scott II, supra note 15.
64. Id. at 792.
65. Drafted by Thomas Paton, counsel for the American Bankers Association, and
completed in 1929, the Bank Code was a direct predecessor of Article 4 of the UCC. See
U.C.C. § 4-101 official comment (1977) ("This article adopts many of the rules of the
[Bank] Code ....

"). Comments to several sections of Article 4 mention the Bank

Code. Scott II, supra note 15, at 761 n.80; eg., official comments to U.C.C. §§ 4-201 to 204,4-207 to -208, 4-211 to -214, 4-301 to -302 (1977). See generally Beutel, The Proposed
Uniform Bank Collections Act and Possibility of Recodification of the Law on Negotiable

Instruments, 9 Tul. L. Rev. 378 (1935) (discussing ABA Code); Bogert, Failed Banks,
Collection Items, and Trust Preferences, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 545 (1931) (same); Paton,
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response to the "risk distortion" imposed on the check collection system
by the courts and the Federal Reserve System during the early part of

this century.66 The Bank Code was "principally a mechanism for eliminating the risk differential between participant and nonparticipant banks
by allocating all significant collection risks to depositors . . . [and]
clearly served the interests of banks."6 7 It had been adopted in eighteen
states by 1932.68 Many of its provisions were restatements of bank-customer contract terms69 that several courts had determined to be unconstitutional sometime before the Bank Code's promulgation.70 Moreover,
the Bank Code experiment was a not-so-covert attempt to undermine application of the Sherman Act:7 "Since they could not fix prices, banks
turned to risk fixing." 7 2 Because financial institutions promulgated the
Bank Code in an effort to avoid "risk differentials" among participant
Bank Collection Legislation, 46 Banking L.J. 508 (1929) (same); Steffen, The Check Collection Muddle, 10 Tul. L. Rev. 537 (1936) (same); Townsend, The Bank Collection Code
of the American Bankers'Association, 8 Tul. L. Rev. 21 (1933) (same).
66. In the late 1800's and early 1900's, financial institutions attempted to impose the
risks of the check collection process on their customers by contract. Courts responded by
construing the contracts against the banks. See, e.g., Harter v. Bank of Brunson, 92 S.C.
440, 444, 75 S.E. 696, 697 (1912). At the same time, private clearinghouse associations,
mostly in Boston and New York, were fixing prices on collection charges. Member banks
were required to charge their customers a fixed rate for collection of out-of-town-items.
Scott II, supra note 15, at 747. Because of these abuses and inefficiencies the Federal
Reserve Board, created in 1913, became part of the check collection process. Id. at 74748; see Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 16, 38 Stat. 251, 268 (1913) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 248(o) (1982)). This federal intrusion affected bank charges as well as the four major
collection risks: "(1) nonpayment in direct forwarding, (2) negligent collecting practices
of intermediate banks, (3) acceptance of worthless remittance in payment, and (4) nonpayment attributable to circuitous routing." Scott II, supra note 15, at 756. The financial
institutions then attempted to avoid the risk-shifting of the Federal Reserve by fixing the
prices that they charged for assuming certain risks, but this exposed the banks to sanctions for violating the antitrust laws. Cf Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
58 (1911) (holding price fixing illegal).
67. Scott II, supra note 15, at 762.
68. See F. Beutel, supra note 30, at 133; Steffen, supra note 65, at 540 n.20.
69. Scott II, supra note 15, at 762 ("[Bank] Code incorporated the provisions of the
[American Bankers Association] standard form contract.").
70. See Beutel, supra note 41, at 358; Scott II, supra note 15, at 761. The court in
Bank of Rocky Mount v. Floyd, 142 N.C. 187, 55 S.E. 95 (1906), after overriding a clear
contractual provision, commented:
While the convenience of persons and corporations engaged in particular lines
of business, and the general custom recognized and acted upon, are properly
given consideration in the construction of contracts and fixing rules of duty and
liability, elementary principles of law founded upon the wisdom and experience
of the ages should not be violated.
Id. at 198, 55 S.E. at 99.
71. It was estimated that in 1913, 91 of the 242 clearinghouse associations in the
country fixed collection charges. See Money Trust Investigation: Before the Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency Reform, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 216, 218 (1913).
"[T]he potential application of the Sherman Act probably made overt attempts to reach
such [agreements] unfeasible." Scott II, supra note 15, at 760. By 1924, these collection
charges had disappeared principally because of their increased vulnerability to antitrust
attack. Id.
72. Scott II, supra note 15, at 760.
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and nonparticipant banks, Professor Scott concluded that the risk differential among new payments systems would occasion a similar reaction
from financial institutions today.7 3 We might, therefore, assume that financial institutions would be at the forefront of the UNPC movement,
but this is not the case.74
The financial community may not be convinced of the need for a payments code that attempts to adjust risks in the same way the Bank Code
did. Professor Scott reported that because of antitrust law developments,
banks determined that they could not fix the prices of customer services.75 The Bank Code was a statutory attempt to do to consumers what
the American Bankers Association had been unable to do through the
use of form contracts.7 6 The Bank Code's anti-competitive effects did not
go unnoticed.7 7 Confronted with the risk differential produced today by
new payments systems, financial institutions could very well hesitate to
endorse legislation that almost certainly would conflict with antitrust
principles and would invite judicial as well as legislative scorn in the contemporary pro-consumer environment.
Furthermore, financial institutions have good reason to feel comfortable with the current risk differentiation. The allocation of risk provided
by Article 4 (with regard to checks) and the common law of contract
(with regard to wire transfers) better serves banks than would a regime
that would extend some of the consumer protection provisions of debit
and credit card law to check and wire transactions. 71 If financial institutions were content with the allocation of risks among transactors, a statute that had as its premise the elimination of that allocation would not
necessarily gain the support of the financial community. To the extent
that the risk-fixing hypothesis is invalid or disfavored by financial institutions, the foundation of the UNPC's unitary treatment of different payment systems is compromised.
In his 1978 Report to the 3-4-8 Committee, Scott described five needs,
in addition to risk-fixing, which could be served by the codification of
payments law: consumer protection controls on contract;' solution of
third party problems; 0 control of natural monopolies;8 1 economies of
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 792; 1983 Memorandum, supra note 13, at 43.
See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
Scott II, supra note 15, at 760.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra note 65 for authority criticizing the Bank Code. Professor Beutel de-

scribed it as a vicious type of class legislation in that it attempted to throw all the risk of
the collection process on the depositors and at the same time preserve for intermediate
banks all the rights of the holders in due course of the paper that they are collecting.

Beutel, supra note 41, at 357-58.
78. It has been estimated that each year $136 trillion is transferred by checks and
wire transfers, while credit cards account for only $49 billion annually. See Little Report, supra note 6, at 12, table 1. Banks are well protected in the check context by UCC
Article 4 and by their ability to contract out of risks in wire transfers.
79. 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 31-35.

80. Id. at 40.
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scale in risk allocation; 2 and supplementation of contract.8 3 Even if the
risk-fixing hypothesis cannot support the UNPC predisposition toward
internal uniformity, Scott's five additional arguments suggest that codification of payments law is commercially expedient. Indeed, in some instances, compromising the internal uniformity of the draft UNPC may
not impair but rather may better serve the goals of commercial codification perceived by the drafters of the UCC. s4
Controls on contract-the first of Scott's five additional reasons for
codification-are necessary because many private contracts prepared by
financial institutions for execution by consumers have been and will
likely continue to be largely unacceptable to courts and legislatures. This
conclusion is supported by experience prior to the promulgation of the
Bank Code and is clearly indicated by the contemporary "consumer protectionist" mood of recent payments legislation.8 5 Another shortcoming
of private contract would be its inability to bind absent third parties. A
contract between customer and bank would not affect the rights of attaching creditors or possible preferences among claimants to funds held
by a failed financial institution. Codification could overcome this shortcoming as well.
Additionally, in the absence of statutory guidance, natural monopolies
could emerge to structure risk allocations "undisciplined by competitive
forces.",8 6 Scott argued that although there is no evidence of price-fixing
in new payments systems, risk-fixing might exist.8 7 Electronic fund
transfer and credit card payment systems may already be dominated by
only one or two major transactors. 8s Scott warned that we will have to
determine whether those interests may be trusted with private rule-making authority without the interposition of comprehensive payments
81. Id. at 35-38.
82. Id. at 40-45.
83. Id. at 45-47.
84. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
85. The limits of private contract between banks and their customers are presently
established with regard to checks by UCC § 4-103(1), which prohibits a bank from contractually disclaiming its duties of good faith and ordinary care. The parties may, however, agree on standards to be used to measure such duties, so long as those standards are
not "manifestly unreasonable." U.C.C. § 4-103(1) (1977). Professor Gilmore has expressed reservations: "The feature of Article 4 as it appears in the final version of the
Code which is enough to make the entire Article objectionable is the freedom of contract
section, § 4-103." Gilmore II, supra note 26, at 375.
The EFTA is more solicitous of the rights of consumers. It forbids "a waiver of any
right conferred or cause of action created by this subchapter. . . [except] a waiver given
in settlement of a dispute or action." 15 U.S.C. § 16931 (1982).
86. 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 35.
87. Id.
88. VISA and MasterCard are the two major national credit card systems used by
consumers. Wire transfers are concentrated in BankWire II and FedWire. Additionally,
there is only one Automated Clearing House (ACH) per region, and one national system
for interchange-the National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA). Id. at
36.
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legislation.8 9
Further, a pervasive statute could establish certain economies of scale
in risk allocation. If all customers of financial institutions were subject to
or protected from the same risks, the industry could structure its
processes and services either to absorb or to guard against losses occasioned by the risk. For example, it would be more efficient if either all
customers or no customers assumed liability for a forged drawer's signature. This economies of scale rationale favoring the codification of payments law is quite similar to an argument originally made to support the
UCC: "Men of commerce want the best laws, but they can live with
'right' laws. And they prefer the right law whose meaning is predictable
and whose application is even, to the best law which operates without
either uniformity or certainty." 9 0 Similarly, Scott's final argument in
favor of the codification of payments law "has been a traditional justification for the commercial law qua law merchant": 9 1 Uniform commercial
legislation provides a backstop to contract by establishing a legal regime
for parties that could be in privity of contract but have failed to make
provision by private agreement. 92 Examples of this are found in the several UCC
provisions that begin with the phrase "unless otherwise
93
agreed."
Each of Scott's additional five "needs" supports the case for codification of payments law. Only the "risk fixing" argument, however, goes
beyond arguing for codification and attempts to establish the desirability
of imposing the same legal rules on different payments systems. The financial community may become more disposed toward the adoption of a
payments code if a code can be prepared that is consistent with Scott's
five additional considerations and thereby serves those interests traditionally served by the codification of payments law.
C. The Case Against a Comprehensive Payments Code
Representatives of financial institutions have expressed serious reservations with both the concept and substance of the UNPC. An accessible
and complete expression of that community's position is the Statement of
the New York Clearing House on the Proposed Uniform New Payments
Code. 94 The New York Clearing House (NYCH) analogized the various
payments systems to the several available transportation systems. Just as
each mode of transport is essentially different in one or more crucial
ways, so too are payments devices. The NYCH explained:
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 37.
Hawkland, supra note 23, at 320.
1978 Report, supra note 14, at 45.
See 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 45-46.
See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-307, 2-308, 2-310, 2-319, 2-322, 2-326, 2-511, 2-513, 2-514,

3-802, 9-112, 9-503 (1977).
94. NYCH Statement, supra note 10. "We see no advantage to be derived from casting aside Articles 3 and 4 simply to develop a 'uniform' or 'comprehensive' payments
code covering all payment systems." Id. at 2.
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While the types of legal issues that must be addressed in fashioning a
law to govern each mode of transportation are similar (i.e., who has
the right of way; what speed limits, if any, should apply; liability for
passengers and parcels), would anyone argue that there is an advantage
in calling pilots, captains, engineers and drivers by one functional
name. . . or by having
one comprehensive code covering all methods
95
of transportation?
Because of the basic differences between payments systems, the NYCH
would not subject the various methods of value transfer to unitary treatment. Instead, the organization would "address separately the problems
identified by the 3-4-8 Committee with electronic funds transfers, Articles 3 and 4 and, if necessary, other payment systems." 9 6 Such an approach would necessarily preclude codification of payments law in a
manner resembling UCC-type "true" codification.
The analogy on which the NYCH argument is founded is, to say the
least, far-fetched. 97 Although it would be ludicrous to impose the same
speed limits on airplanes and buses, it is correct to impose on airlines and
bus companies, as common carriers, the same standard of care toward

passengers. 98 Many such elements of transportation systems, which operate as do our laws of tort and contract (rather than physics), are susceptible to codification, but that is not to say that the same tort or
contract rules should apply to distinguishable problems. If overbooking
is a contract problem in air travel but not in intra-city bus travel, it may
not be appropriate to subject both systems to the same overbooking regulation. As the NYCH observed, "differences in operational aspects, frequently reflected in the rights and obligations of the parties, constitute
the reason for the utility of one system over another."9 9 The inquiry
should focus on how best to order the differences in the interest of predictability and certainty. A payments code could formulate the differences to "identify results that can be justified on efficiency or
distributional grounds,"" ° without impairing or eliminating transactor
choice. Such a comprehensive enactment could solve essentially different
problems in different ways but still treat in a single, unitary enactment as
many problems of payments law as coherently as possible.
There is a further problem: Reluctant attorneys fear the unknown.
Although current payments laws overlap and conflict,' 0 ' they are famil95. Id. at 10-11. As one commentator has noted, the arguments presented by the
financial community closely parallel those made in the 1950's when the New York Study
Commission considered and criticized the proposed UCC. Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at
377 n.119.
96. NYCH Statement, supra note 10, at 3 (emphasis in original).
97. But see Id. at 12 (Notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, "[w]e believe
that this analogy is not far-fetched.").
98. See R. Hutchinson, A Treatise on the Law of Carriers §§ 893-895 (3d ed. 1906);
W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 34 (4th ed. 1971).
99. NYCH Statement, supra note 10, at 12.
100. Scott II, supra note 15, at 792.
101. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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iar to the lawyers, bankers and the public who work with them regularly.
As one commentator queried, "having mastered these legal languages,
should we all now be forced to forget them and learn Esperanto?" '
Arguably we should. Commercial attorneys have been willing to
relearn. °3 But they would be ill-advised to forget the "legal languages"
they have learned because knowledge of the old rules would aid in construction of a payments code. Moreover, any piecemeal solution to the
problems of the currently incoherent payments law will require attorneys
to learn the new "patchwork" but will not guarantee consistent treatment of similarly situated transactors.
III.

IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON DENOMINATORS

Effective codification depends on the identification of common denominators in seemingly different systems and the development of analytical
and definitional tools that emphasize those essential principles while denying legal effect to insubstantial differences. The architects of the UCC
set out to formulate, or perhaps more accurately, discover the essential
principles of commercial law. Once those essential principles were identified, they served as the foundation on which the UCC experiment has
developed. The drafters remained sensitive to the problems that transactors familiar with the established law would encounter with legislation
that purported to make drastic changes. The drafters' choice of essential
principles was therefore informed by established practices. The same approach is useful in codifying payments law.
It is no longer appropriate, if it ever was, to distinguish between payments systems as either electronic or paper-based. The intrusion of computers into payments procedures has eliminated any bold line that might
have separated paper-based devices (checks and notes) from those devices that operate in concert with magnetic tapes or telephonic tones.
The corporeal safety paper "item" of Article 4 stands a very good chance
of being transformed into an electronic impulse somewhere along its
journey from drawer to drawee and perhaps back to drawer."
The
credit card slip signed by a customer at point-of-sale is even more likely
to undergo such a metamorphosis."'0 "The central characteristic of electronic fund transfers . . . is the use of computer and electronic technology in place
of checks or other paper items to effectuate the transfer of
10 6
funds."
The UNPC drafters realized that the scope of a uniform payments law
102. Geary, supra note 15, at 341. Professor Gilmore confronted this same argument
during the UCC debate. See Gilmore II, supra note 26, at 379 (replying to Professor
Beutel's assertions in Beutel, supra note 41, at 348).
103. See Llewellyn, supra note 32, at 368.
104. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
105. See 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 19-20.
106. 2A F. Hart & W. Willier, Bender's UCC Service, Commercial Paper § 16.01, at
16-8 (1972) (emphasis in original); see S. Rep. No. 915, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
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generally should not be determined by reference to the relative electronic
sophistication of the various payments systems. It is inappropriate to
suggest that a payments system that operates without indispensable paper should be governed primarily by consumer protection legislation,
while the law governing paper-based transactions favors the interests of
financial institutions. Distinctions should be drawn only on the basis of
differences that matter,"°7 and it is better if those "differences" are familiar principles of established law. When the drafters of pervasive legislation identify and give effect to the essential elements of their subject
matter, the drafters are better able to compose the type of "pre-emptive,
systematic, and comprehensive enactment" envisioned by Professor
Hawkland. "8
The UNPC minimizes the legal effect of noncrucial distinctions between payments systems. Section 51, which defines both "draw" and
"pay" orders, contains the primary example of the Draft's formulation of
essential principles." 9 A draw order, such as a check, flows from a
drawer to a payee and "pull[s] credits back to the person entitled to payment in a direction opposite to the one in which the order is transmitted."' l 0 The UNPC comment to this section suggests that, in addition to
the familiar check, a draw order may be electronic, such as "a prearranged debit through a clearing house."'' The student of commercial
paper is comfortable following the flow of warranties from endorsee to
endorser/presenter to drawee, as payment of the item flows back in the
opposite direction." 12 In the automated clearing house setting a prearranged debit works similarly: A depositor of the "receiving" bank authorizes a vendor to debit the depositor's account at the receiving bank; the
vendor notifies its bank-the "originating" bank-of the preauthorized
debit; the originating bank then credits the vendor's account for the appropriate amount and forwards electronic advice of the transaction to the
appropriate regional Automated Clearing House (ACH), which sends
the advice on to the receiving bank, which debits the depositor's account.
Just as in the check collection scenario, the order goes from debtor
(drawer/depositor) to creditor (payee/vendor), and the creditor utilizes
its bank (depositary/originating) to effect collection through a centralized medium (Federal Reserve Bank/ACH)13and charge the debtor's account institution (drawee/receiving bank).'
The pay order denomination also formulates the common characteristics of different payments devices: "The order and the funds are pushed
from the drawee to the payee, and the order and funds move in the same
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See 1983 Memorandum, supra note 13, at 1.
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
See U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 51.
Id. § 51 comment 1 on purpose and existing law (emphasis in original).
Id.
See U.C.C. §§ 3-417, 4-207 (1977).
See 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 13-17.
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direction.""' 4 Wire transfers and prearranged credit orders through an
ACH are examples of pay orders.I 5 Thus the drafters identified the lowest common denominator in seemingly different systems and developed
an analytical and definitional tool that emphasizes that common denominator while denying effect to insubstantial differences.
IV.

THE

UN-PC

APPROACH TO STOP PAYMENT AND REVERSIBILITY

The treatment of stop payment and reversibility in P.E.B. Draft No. 3
of the UNPC 1 6 offers a dynamic context in which to appraise the
UNPC's jurisprudential perspective and to seek to identify the essential
common denominators. The issues in this area have been around long
enough to have come into sharp focus" 7 and the elements of the several
payments devices are established. The commentators and the drafters of
existing payments legislation have identified certain distinctions based on
the reasons for the customer's exercise of a right to stop or reverse payment, the type of payment medium and the sophistication of the customer.'I" The rules in force under current law represent the inconsistent
conclusions reached as a result of the interaction of those transactional
variables and the particular drafter's appraisal of cost" 9 and risk t1 ° considerations. The UNPC drafters would therefore have engaged in an
analysis designed to yield state-of-the-art commercial law with respect to
the right to stop and reverse payment.
The two primary reasons for a customer's requesting a stop or reversal
of payment are loss or theft of the payment device and dispute resolution.
The overwhelming majority of stop payment requests in the familiar context of UCC "items"'' are issued by customers in response to the loss or
theft of a check. Nevertheless, insofar as "the party in possession of the
funds enjoys an edge in any dispute,"'' 2 a customer may retain substantial leverage by exercising a stop payment order. In virtually every instance in which the stop payment of an item would be exercised, the right
114. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 51 comment on purpose and existing law (emphasis in
original).
115. Id.
116. For discussions of these issues in the context of the various payments systems, see
Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at 379-407; Nimmer, supra note 56, at 513-15, 524-34.
117. For a description of the genesis of stop payment, see W. Holdsworth, supra note
29, at 130-31.
118. See, eg., Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at 366-78; Nimmer, supra note 56, at 488515; Scott II, supra note 15, at 782-92. See generally Chin, Electronic Fund Transfer A
Selected Bibliography, 13 U.S.F.L. Rev. 555 (1979) (references to materials involving
EFT systems); Scott, Bibliography, 2 Computer L.J. 183 (1980) (same).
119. Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at 367-69.
120. Other considerations include: operational efficiency of financial institutions; costs
to merchants; and the accommodation of users of the systems. Id. at 369-79.
121. See U.C.C. § 4-104(I)(g) (1977).
122. Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at 364. Retaining possession of the funds may be the
only way a party can afford to force the payee into dispute resolution. Id.
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is aleatory, dependent upon both fortuity' 23 and, in the rare case, the
sophistication of the drawer. 2 4 The drafters of the UNPC have recognized the two distinct reasons customers abort payments and, for the
most part, treat each separately.
A. Liability as DrawerFor UnauthorizedOrders Under the UNPC
A drawer may avoid liability for an "unauthorized order"'' 2 pursuant
to the provisions of section 200 of the UNPC by issuing the appropriate
notice of loss or theft to the "payor account institution."' 2 6 The section
encourages customers to notify the drawee to dishonor an order. A consumer who fails to notify his account institution of loss or theft of an
access device will be liable for the first fifty dollars (so long as the total
loss is less than $500) whether or not his negligence contributed to the
loss or theft. 127 This consumer liability ceiling is, as described, limited.
In all other cases a drawer, consumer or otherwise, whose negligence
"substantially contributed to the order becoming unauthorized," is precluded by section 202(2) from complaining that the order was unauthorized.' 28 Although negligence is left undefined, the UNPC drafters
explained that "it should generally consist of actions which could be
taken by the drawer to prevent the loss at a lower cost than the discounted expectation of loss.' ' 129 There is, then, a very clear incentive for
drawers to issue an "unauthorized order" notice, like a loss or theft stop
payment order, to avoid the expense of litigation and the vagaries of negligence analysis. Indeed, failure to notify an account institution of sus123. The issue is one of timing-whether the customer can exercise his right to stop
payment before the check gets to the bank. The more quickly the check is "collected,"
the less time a customer has to stop payment. UCC § 4-403(1) (incorporating UCC § 4303(1)) provides that the stop payment order is untimely if the bank has accepted the
item, paid the item in cash, settled for the item, or completed posting of the item. See
U.C.C. §§ 4-303(1), 4-403(1) (1977).
124. The payor bank would argue that under UCC § 4-407(a) it is not liable for wrongful payment over a stop payment order, because the drawer would have been liable in any
case to the holder in due course of the item. An intermediary bank may be a holder in
due course. To avoid that argument the sophisticated drawer can cross out "the order
of" on his check. Without that language the check is not a negotiable instrument under
UCC § 3-104(l)(d). Consequently there can be no holder in due course and the drawer is
protected against the bank's § 4-407(a) claim.
125. The UNPC defines an "unauthorized order" as "any order which is not authorized." U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 54(2). An order is "authorized" if it is initiated by the
drawer or is initiated or paid with the drawer's authorization "and remains so unless...
materially altered . . .[or] transmitted without any necessary authorization, including,
in the case of a written draw order, all valid endorsements." Id. § 54(1).
126. Id. § 200(l). UNPC § 53(4) defines "payor account institution" as "the account
institution which maintains the account directed to be debited by the drawer of an order." Id. § 53(4). The comments provide that the term is applicable to both pay and
draw orders. Id. § 53 comment 3; cf.U.C.C. § 4-105(b) (1977) (Payor bank "means a
bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted.").
127. Id. § 200(2)(a).
128. Id. § 202(2).
129. Id. § 200 comment 3 on purposes.
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pected or known loss or theft may very well constitute section 202(2)
negligence. Article 4 of the UCC nowhere provides that failure to notify
a drawee bank of the loss or theft of a check alone constitutes negligence
that would permit the bank to charge the customer's account for the
unauthorized order. 30
Section 200 neither expressly provides that a bank may charge a customer for issuing an unauthorized order notice nor precludes a bank
from doing so."' The provision does impose on banks costs that arguably ought not to be passed on to all of a bank's customers without reference to whether an individual customer issues a notice. In any event,
section 200 would be better drafted if the right to charge were either
granted or denied expressly.
Whether banks may, under current check law, charge a customer for
exercising the right to stop payment was considered in two opinions of
the Michigan Attorney General, whose position changed between April
13, 1981132 and August 7, 1981.133 The April Opinion argued that to
permit banks to charge a fee would sanction reallocation of risk in a manner contrary to the scheme provided by the UCC. That position was, of
course, naive. If banks were precluded from passing on the cost of a stop
payment to a particular customer, they would endeavor to spread the
cost over all customers. The August Opinion essentially repudiates the
Attorney General's earlier remarks by focusing on the freedom of contract sections of the UCC 34 and deciding that customers may agree to
pay a stop payment fee. The substance of that "agreement" was given
only passing reference. The two opinions are, in reality, irreconcilable,
and we may assume that the change of position resulted from the Attorney General's Office coming to terms with economic realities.
UNPC section 200, insofar as it concerns loss or theft of an order, is
consistent with the better view concerning risk allocation in the unauthorized order context. "Those risks include liability to the customer for
damages suffered as a result of bank negligence or error, and in other
130. See U.C.C. § 4-406 (1978)
131. See U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 200. UNPC § 425(13) provides that a bank "may
require any person directing it to stop or reverse an order to pay any fees or charges for
such service which it reasonably believes are necessary to cover the cost of providing the
service." Id. § 425(13). By application of the construction principle of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), 2A C. Sands,
Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 47.23, at 123 (4th ed. 1973), it could
be argued that the drafters did not intend to sanction a bank charge for issuance of an
authorized order notice, because § 200 contains no language similiar to that in § 425(13).
132. Op. Mich. Atty Gen. No. 5867 (1981) (bank may not charge customer a fee on
stop payment order), reprintedin 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1626 (1981).
133. Op. Mich. Att'y Gen. No. 5947 (1981) (bank may contract with customer for fee
on stop payment order), reprintedin 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1445 (1981). This
opinion addressed the question of enforceability of an express contract between a bank
and its customer in which the customer agrees to pay a fee in connection with a stop
payment order.
134. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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situations, liability to a third party claim that the stop payment was improper."' 135 If an account institution fails to honor a proper unauthorized-order notice, UNPC section 200 shifts the risk of loss on the
instrument from the customer to the financial institution. This section
departs from current check law by placing the crucial burden of proof on
the account institution, which must show, "if the order is unauthorized
. . . that the conditions for liability of the drawer . . . have been
met."' 136 Current check law provides that the drawer bears the burden of
proof on the damages issue.13 The second risk, that of a third-party
claim, is inapposite in the section 200 context, in which the loss or theft
of the payment medium is a prerequisite to application of the provision.
If a third party asserts a claim that the unauthorized-order notice was
improperly given effect, the issue is thrown out of section 200 and comes
within the scope of section 425, which precludes stop payment with regard to those media that have been issued by the account institution "in
payment of its own underlying obligation."'' 38 That language is intended
to include "cashier's checks, bank drafts, 'teller's checks,' money orders,
and certified checks."' 3 9 Such media are also referred to as "remittance
items.""
The basic scheme of section 200 works. The unitary approach, which
subjects all nonremittance orders to the same legal rules, is successful in
this context because choice among nonremittance items is not important
here: No rational transactor would use any conceivable noncash payment medium and not prefer to limit its exposure in the event that the
order is lost or stolen. It is therefore not difficult to establish a consistent, acceptable rule for avoiding payment of unauthorized orders. In
the terms of the NYCH analogy,' if a traveler loses his ticket, a single
rule would work as well to minimize the loss whether the ticket was for
passage by train, bus or airplane.
UNPC section 200 illustrates that so long as important choice is not
impaired, a comprehensive code can order the essential principles of
commercial practice to improve the status quo. When meaningful choice
is impaired and essential principles are not properly utilized as a foundation, however, the aims of true codification are frustrated. The next portion of the Article evaluates the most recent draft UNPC reversibility
provision by reference to that jurisprudential perspective.
B. Dispute Stop Payment and Reversibility under the UNPC
Section 425 of the UNPC provides that a customer may stop or reverse
135. Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at 369 (citations omitted).

136. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 200(3).
137. U.C.C. § 4-403(3) (1977).
138. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425(1).
139. Id. § 425 comment 7 on purposes.
140. Id.
141. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
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payment of "authorized" orders 142 to maintain leverage in a contract dispute. 143 Does this section, as a matter of commercial code jurisprudence,
represent the proper formulation of essential principles? If the drafters
have not identified and made operative the correct bases for distinction,
the product of their efforts will frustrate rather than serve the controlling
objectives of commercial codification and preclude the enactment of a
payments law that is truly pre-emptive, systematic and comprehensive.
In addition to continuing the UCC rule of stop payment, UNPC section 425 also provides consumer drawers a right to reverse an order of
fifty dollars or more within three business days after the order has been
"finally paid,"'" so long as the order was not for cash withdrawal or a
check transmitted in paper form (in other words, not truncated), and the
drawer has not waived the right to reverse orders drawn on the account.'4 5 Insofar as the section creates a sweeping consumer payment
reversal right, it has attracted the displeasure of financial interests.' 4 6
Consumer advocates, on the other hand, would complain that any
"right" that consumers may waive is ephemeral. 147
The arguments against provision of a right to reverse payment focus
on the burden that such provision would impose on payments systems.
The UNPC section would provide consumers with a pervasive right: Pay
as well as draw orders would be subject to reversal.' 4 8 Nevertheless, the
section cannot be criticized as eliminating all differences among the affected payment media. Remittance orders, as well as the exceptions
noted above,'4 9 provide transactors a form of "choice." But the consumer's option to waive the reversal right will likely be a function of the
choice of the merchant or financial institution, rather than that of the
consumer.
Although no distinct interest group has come rushing to the defense of
section 425, there are cogent arguments in support of a right to reverse
payment. The right now exists in the credit card context. '5 Moreover,
many of the arguments in favor of providing a stop payment right are
apposite in the reversal context, such as the policy of improving the bar142. For the definition of an "authorized order," see id. § 54(1).
143. See U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425 & commentl on purposes.
144. See id. § 425(2).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., NYCH Statement, supra note 10, at 18.
147. In order to protect consumers some commentators maintain that stop payment or
reversibility should be mandated for all EFT systems. See, eg., Note, Overcoming the
Obstacles to Implementation of Point-Of-Sale Electronic Fund Transfer Systems: EFTA
and the New Uniform Payments Code, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1351, 1369 nn.84-85 (1983).
148. See U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425 comment 1 on purposes.)
149. See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. The point-of-sale systems in Michigan and Wisconsin currently provide consumers a right to reverse payment. See Mich.
Comp.Laws Ann. § 488.16 (West Supp. 1984-85); Wis. Admin. Code § [Commissioner
of Banking] 14.09 (1983).
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gaining power of a drawer/buyer in a dispute with a payee/seller."'5 The
right to reverse is a necessary adjunct to the stop payment right. Insofar
as the right to stop payment is cut off after the order is paid, the provision of a right to reverse payment for three business days after final payment replaces the "stop payment window [that] may be appreciably
shortened. . . by check truncation [and the] use of on-line debit cards at
the point-of-sale."' 5 2 Also, in conjunction with three other UNPC provisions,' 5 3 section 425 avoids the pro-bank result currently guaranteed
under UCC sections 4-403 and 4-407 to payor collecting banks and payor
banks by subrogation.' 5 4
Those who generally resist the provision of a right to reverse payment
object particularly to section 425's formulation of the right. The objections raise important issues of commercial code jurisprudence and have
been urged not only by those with vested interests in the health and welfare of financial institutions, but also by those who are more impartial.
Roland Brandel, a practicing attorney who has been quite active in the
evolving law of new payments systems, 55 expressed his uneasiness with
both the concept of reversibility and section 425 at the 1983 Uniform
New Payments Code Invitational Conference.' 56 He argued that the
right to reverse fails on a basic fairness level because it gives consumers
an absolute right to steal after making a simple phone call. Moreover, he
argued that inasmuch as the expense of providing the right would ultimately be shifted to consumers, 57 we should consider that cost before we
decide that the provision of such a right is in the best interests of all
consumers. Brandel believed that reversibility, to the extent ever desirable, should be a matter of sales law, governed by UCC article 2, rather
than payments law. If considered within the Sales Article, reversibility
could be treated more directly as a problem of dealing with recalcitrant
merchants. Brandel would prefer that the problem be addressed by the
use of consumer protection sanctions instead of burdening the payments
system. Arguably, the financial institutions may not be the most economically efficient segment of the commercial community to confront
151. See U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425 comment 1 on purposes.
152. Id. § 425 comment 2 on purposes.
153. Id. §§ 103, 426, 432. Section 103 outlines the rights of a funds claimant with or
without limited due course rights. Section 426 deals with competing claims to an account. Section 432 provides a payor account institution's right to subrogation on improper payment.
154. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
155. See generally D. Baker & R. Brandel, The Law of Electronic Fund Transfer Systems (1983 Cum. Supp. to N. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1); R. Brandel, J. Terraciano & B. Abbott, Truth in Lending Compliance Manual (2d ed. 1981); Brandel &
Soloway, Consumer FinancialServices, 38 Bus. Law. 1267 (1983); Brandel, Electronic
Fund Transfers and the New Payments Code, 38 Bus. Law. 1355 (1983). Mr. Brandel is a
partner with the San Francisco firm of Morrison & Foerster.
156. R. Brandel, Remarks at the Uniform New Payments Code 1983 Invitational Conference (Sept. 30, 1983) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
157. Id.
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the problem of recalcitrant merchants. Indeed, Brandel suggested that
small claims courts may provide the best means for consumers to vindicate their rights." 8
Brandel's criticism of section 425's particular formulation of a reversal
right is useful. He raises several fundamental questions. First, how does
a consumer or payee know if there is a right to reverse the payment? If a
check is used by a consumer drawer and truncated prior to its reaching
the drawee, there is a right to reverse for three days after final payment of
the item."19 But if the paper check is not truncated prior to its reaching
the drawee, there is no right to reverse. Also, insofar as a consumer will
not know precisely when final payment has occurred, he will not know
when the right has lapsed. Recall that this problem exists under current
check law." 6 Second, how does the payee know whether the account on
which the check is drawn provides a right to reverse? Section 425 provides small comfort to the payee in that the comments suggest that "account institutions may specially identify orders drawn on consumer
accounts for the convenience of persons taking such orders and for account institutions making availability determinations."'' Finally, to
what extent is the policy in favor of more immediate funds availability in
diametric opposition to a reversal right? Recent legislative initiatives
have suggested that there will be increasing pressure on financial institutions to make funds available for withdrawal as of right as expeditiously
as possible. 62 UNPC section 421(2) provides that funds are not available as of right on consumer orders until three days from final payment
have elapsed.' 63 But even those banks that are currently willing to expose themselves to insufficient funds risks and permit customers to draw
on uncollected funds may not be willing to increase that exposure by
permitting withdrawal where there is the additional possibility of reversal. An impartial study conducted by the National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers (NCEFT) concluded that, in the context of pointof-sale transactions, reversibility should not be required by legislation.'"
The study noted that "the merchants most likely to accept EFT services
158. Id.
159. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425(2)(b).
160. See U.C.C. § 4-303(1) (1977).
161. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425 comment 2 on purposes.
162. See, eg., 1983 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 234 (bill to establish reasonable time period within
which bank must permit customers to draw on deposits); 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv., Ch. 1011
(West) (bill to require that credit given by bank for item deposited becomes available to
customer for withdrawal as of right); see also N.Y. Times, June 18, 1983, at 29, col. 6
(discussing the New York legislation).
163. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 421(2).
164. EFT in the U.S., supra note 1, at 51. The National Commission on Electric Fund
Transfers has 26 members drawn from the government, financial institutions and the
public. The Commission was directed by Congress to "conduct a thorough study and
investigation ... and to recommend appropriate administrative action and legislation
necessary in connection with the possible development of private and public EFT systems." Id. at iii.
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are the large retailers who generally allow customers to return merchandise within a reasonable period of time . . . [whereas] [d]isreputable
merchants are unlikely to accept EFT with required reversibility."' 6 5 If
all or nearly all payments media afford consumers a reversal right, consumers would be denied meaningful choice. Although section 425 provides that consumers may waive the right to reverse, a waivable right
may be of dubious value. Financial institutions could price the right in
such a way as to preclude effectively its exercise, or merchants could
refuse to accept media that give access to accounts providing a right to
reverse. A waivable right to reverse, then, may do nothing to preserve
real consumer choice. The UNPC drafters have failed to identify and
utilize the correct essential principles and, therefore, have not formulated an effective reversal provision in section 425.
V.

PROVISION OF A RIGHT TO REVERSE PAYMENT BY REFERENCE
TO ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES

A reversal right drafted in a manner consistent with commercial code
jurisprudence could overcome the Brandel and NCEFT reservations.
Future drafts of a payments code should provide a right to reverse payments for a specified period only when a consumer uses a payment medium that draws against a prearranged line of credit.' 6 6 This
recommendation would modify the P.E.B. Draft No. 3 provision by focusing on the cash/credit distinction, a crucial essential principle, and by
serving rather than undermining transactor expectations. 6 7 Additionally, even if the right is provided only in the credit context, real consumer
choice would be maintained so long as the right cannot be waived.
Although proposed section 425 draws distinctions among payments
media to some extent, it does not distinguish in terms palatable to a good
portion of the commercial community. This is a difficult area in which to
establish meaningful differences that will prove tenable over the course of
the development of new payments systems. For instance, while it may be
desirable at the present time to encourage the development of point-ofsale (POS) systems, a reversal right should not attach to that medium
merely for the sake of better marketing that product. Marketing, to the
extent of making distinctions to encourage the use of one payment device
165. Id. at 51.
166. In the event the UNPC is ultimately prepared as a statute regulating wholesale
payment systems and leaves the provision of individual consumer rights to separate federal and state legislation, see supra note 21, the reversibility issue does not go away.
Future adjustments of consumer protection law will need to come to terms with the right
to reverse payment, which is already available in some retail payment systems. See supra
notes 54-57, 150 and accompanying text.
167. For a case that considers the importance of effectuating transactor expectations,
see Santos v. First Nat'l State Bank, 186 N.J. Super. 52, 70, 451 A.2d 401, 410 (1982)
("The [UCC's] ambiguities give us concern, as well as the realization that, because cashier's checks are perceived by the public as cash-like, the [UCCI should be interpreted to
limit the defenses that can be raised.").
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over another, is not the province of a true commercial code. It may very
well be that technology will develop a payments system more desirable
than POS. "[lit is a matter of vital importance that [a code] as a whole
be kept in terms of such generality as to allow an easy and unstrained
application of its provisions to new patterns of business behavior."'

68

Gilmore argued in favor of recognizing certain strategic strong
points 1 69 that could support a commercial code as business practices developed. The essential principles or strategic strong points identified
ought to serve rather than frustrate the elusive goal of simplicity. 7 °
The credit/cash difference is an essential principle-a crucial basis for
distinction-that is certain to endure so long as selling money for "interest" remains popular. The provision of a right to reverse payments only
in the credit card context would be consistent with commercial code jurisprudence. Financial institutions could use the same familiar credit
evaluation techniques now in use to screen applicants for credit cards
and overdraft privileges, thereby further reducing the likelihood that the
right to reverse would be exercised irresponsibly. From the drawee
bank's viewpoint, reversibility would give rise to increased costs-perhaps no greater and maybe less on a per item basis than those produced
by the exercise of a stop payment right-which can be passed directly on
to the consumer when the reversal right is exercised. For other banks in
the chain of collection, the right to reverse would raise no more than the
familiar funds availability issue. The financial community's provision of
the right could be used in the give and take of a uniform payments code
drafting process as a counterweight to consumers' lobbying for more expeditious availability of credits for withdrawal. Moreover, depositary
banks would continue to earn interest on the uncollected or not-yet-reversed funds.
Permitting a right to reverse only in the credit context is consistent
with commercial expectations and practical realities. Whether or not
this right exists, a consumer who has drawn against a line of credit remains in possession of the funds and the leverage that goes with possession. From the typical consumer's viewpoint, only the identity of the
potential plaintiff changes. At the end of the provided reversal period the
risk of nonpayment shifts from the merchant to the drawee financial institution, but the credit risk that remains is no more than the drawee
bargained for when it issued the credit device and is therefore no longer
pertinent to the reversal calculus.
The proposal is also consistent with the needs identified by Professor
168. Gilmore I, supra note 2, at 1355. Professor Gilmore also noted that
"[c]ommercial codification cannot successfully overparticularize: the penalty for being
too precise is that the statute will have to keep coming in for repairs (and amendment is a
costly, cumbersome and unsatisfactory process) or else become a dead-letter." Id.
169. See id. at 1358.

170. See id. at 1356.
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Scott, which are served by the codification of payments law. 7 '
First, provision of an inalienable right to reverse when a line of credit
is utilized guarantees real consumer protection controls on contract,
which are uncertain if the right may be waived. Financial institutions
benefit by charging interest when a payment medium draws on credit,
and a right to reverse benefits the consumer. Although reversibility
would burden the payments system, account institutions could be (and
are under proposed section 425) permitted to charge a consumer for exercising the right. Also, insofar as credit access by use of payment media
may increase impulse sales, reversibility is consistent with federal and
state laws giving consumers a period of time after an "in-house" sale
(usually of the door-to-door variety) in which to withdraw (reverse) the
purchase commitment. If increased impulse sales are occasioned by
more immediate access to credit, the same consumer protection policies
served by statutory "cooling-off periods" in door-to-door sales may be
effected by permitting reversibility.
Second, the proposal will provide solutions to third party problems.
Merchants and intermediary financial institutions are the affected third
parties if reversibility of payments is permitted. The proposal provides
law to govern those third party relationships, and may, in fact, supply
that allocation of rights and duties for which the parties would bargain in
the absence of prohibitive transaction costs. 17 2 If merchants could gain
more from increased sales than they would lose from consumers' irresponsible exercise of a right to reverse, merchants and consumers would
agree to the provision of reversibility if they were able to contract on the
issue. Financial institutions would contract with both merchants and
consumers to permit reversibility if interest revenue exceeded the cost of
providing the service. Under current law, national credit card services
provide for reversibility, and consumers pay for that right in the form of
interest. Although the proposal would not provide banks a right to discount checks as they now do with credit card slips, it would permit banks
to charge consumers for exercising the right to reverse, a charge for
which current credit card law does not provide.
Third, control of natural monopolies would be facilitated by the proposal. Professor Scott offered the Visa and Master Card systems as ex171. See 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 31-47. See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
172. Legal fees incurred in the course of negotiating a contract are an example of
transaction costs. See W. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis 631-32
(4th ed. 1977). It may cost an individual consumer a small amount to find a merchant
willing to permit reversal on a particular payments medium, but that small amount multiplied by all consumer purchases accomplished by the use of reversible media would
prove burdensome. The proposal avoids that burdensome transaction cost. For a recent,
if inconclusive, study of the effects of credit card use on retail sales, see Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Credit Cards in the U.S. Economy: Their Impact on Costs,
Prices, and Retail Sales (1983).
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amples of a natural monopoly. 173 By guaranteeing consumers a right to
reverse and extending reversibility to payment devices other than national credit cards, the anti-competitive effects of such natural monopolies are reduced. Under the proposal, any bank that offers overdraft
protection would necessarily offer reversibility, thus giving the consumer
greater choice in selecting a payment medium. The provision of an inalienable statutory right to reverse also precludes natural monopolists
from denying consumers the right that a truly competitive environment
might provide.
Fourth, because the proposed formulation would be mandatory, it may
achieve even greater economies of scale in risk allocation than would
result were the right to reverse waivable. Finally, it is inappropriate to
have a merely supplemental (waivable) rule governing consumer revers74
ibility. Although Professor Scott recognized this in his 1978 Report,1
proposed section 425 ignores the argument against mere supplementation: "Any rules of merely supplemental nature, which are capable of
being varied by private agreement, perform no service to the parties" to
transactions achieving economies of scale, such as bank credit card transactions or wire transfers.' 7 - The proposal of this Article, then, merely
brings the reversibility provision in line with the policy of the fifth need
by making the right to reverse mandatory in the credit context.
CONCLUSION
A UNPC should serve traditional and proven principles of commercial
code jurisprudence in order to improve the current piecemeal legislation
governing payments devices. While it is important that the drafters remain sensitive to the common characteristics and problems of diverse
payments media, essential principles should be identified and utilized to
preserve real choice for transactors. P.E.B. Draft No. 3 of the UNPC
alternately succeeds (in the stop payment element of section 200) and
fails (in the reversal provision of section 425) to formulate and utilize the
correct essential principles. The argument here has suggested that, inasmuch as transactors are almost always more comfortable with the familiar, the addition of a credit component to a payments device should
determine the provision of a right to reverse.
The 3-4-8 Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code may be expected to offer a fourth draft of the
UNPC. Current credit card law suggests that a right to reverse is both
commercially desirable and practical. This Article has urged that the
right be maintained in future drafts of the UNPC but limited to the
173. See 1978 Report, supra note 15, at 35-38. A "natural monopoly" results where

one business of efficient size can produce all or more than the market can absorb at a
remunerative price. Id.; see Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp.. 295 F.Supp. 373,
377 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
174. 1978 Report, supra note 15, at 46.

175. Id at 45-46.
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credit context. It is hoped that the architects of uniform and codified
payments legislation will consider the jurisprudential arguments offered
here in preparing the black-letter law of the next draft.

